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In this paper the theory of a class of zero-sum two-person (P and E) stochastic 
finite state game problems is presented. The state transition process is assumed 
to be Markovian and hence is governed by a conditional probability distribu- 
tion function in terms of which the state transitton equatron and payoff func- 
tional are expressed. The players attempt to “min-max” the expected value of 
a payoff functional by choosing an optimal pair of strategies-namely, a pair 
of behavioral strategies that satisfies a particular double inequality. 
The application of Bellman’s optimality principle leads to necessary condi- 
tions for the optimality of a pair of strategies and a recursion equation for the 
optimal expected payoff vector. 
Two cases are considered: games in which each player can measure the state 
perfectly, and games in which the measurements are corrupted by noise. In 
both cases optimal feedback decision sequences are obtained; in the case of noisy 
measurements, decisions are conditioned on the previous measurement 
histories of each player. 4 simple two-stage pursuit problem is solved. 
The theory is shown to be closely related to the static theory of J. Von 
Neumann and 0. Morgenstern [16], first published in 1944. However, it is 
pointed out that the present theory may result in substantial savings in com- 
putation time and cost. 
Since the publication of Isaac’s book [l] in 1965, there has been considerable 
interest and activity in Game Theory. Berkovitz [2, 31 in two papers has 
developed rigorous theories of deterministic differential games using Calculus 
of Variations and Dynamic Programming techniques. Leitmann and Mon 
[4, 51 have done likewise using geometric methods. Extensions of the origina 
theories have been legion: papers by Halanay [6] and Friedman [7] are 
indicative of some of the directions recent investigations have taken. Halkin [8], 
Holtzman and Halkin [9], and Blaquiere and Leitmann [lo] have developed 
geometric theories of multistage control systems. 
-4s yet, little has been done in the realm of stochastic games. Zadeh [Ill 
solved a discrete pursuit-evasion game, while Kashyap [12] used necessary 
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conditions derived by Halkin to solve a stochastic optimal control prob1em.l 
Ho [13], and Behn and Ho [14], solved linear differential games of the 
pursuit-evasion type and Speyer [15] discussed, for this same class of games, 
the optimal control law in the presence of singularities. 
This paper presents a theory of multistage finite state stochastic zero-sum 
two-person games. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived enabling 
the selection, at each stage, of optimal strategies and hence, of optimal 
decision sequences (policies). The optimal strategies are true feedback decision 
rules. In the case of noisy measurements, each player selects his strategies 
conditioned upon his previous decisions and his tota measurement history. 
By suppressing one player, say P, one obtains a theory of multistage 
finite-state stochastic control processes [ 121. 
Section 1 outlines the problem when both players possess perfect infor- 
mation concerning the state-of-the-game prior to making control decisions. 
In Section 2 necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained enabling a 
means of determining the strategies and the expected \-alue of the game. 
The results are estended in Section 2.4 to games in which both players make 
noisy measurements of the states-of-the-game. In Section 3 results are 
discussed and suggestions for future research in related topics are offered. 
Section 4 is devoted to the solution of a simple pursuit-evasion game, 
1. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1.1. Preliminaries 
The stage of the game will be characterized by a variable t that sequentiall! 
assumes the values t = 0, 1, 2,..., K; t is (but needn’t be) the time. 
Let s(t), u(t), and v(t), denote respectively, the state-of-the-game, the 
control of player P, and the control of player E, at stage t. The state-of-the- 
game, s(t), can be any one of n + 1 elements in a prescribed finite set 
s A {so 9 Sl ,..-, sn); control u(t) can be any one of r elements in a prescribed 
finite set U & {ul, us ,..., u,>; and control u(t) can be any one of s elements 
in a prescribed finite set V & {zll , wB ,..., a,}. 
Changes in the state-of-the-game are governed by the reIation 
s(t + 1) = g(s(t), u(t), v(t), 5(t)) Uj 
where g is a deterministic function and t(t) is an uncertainty vector in a 
finite set 
;= g(s(t), u(t), w(t), S(t)), s(t + 1) E s, s(t) E s, u(t) E u, V(t) E 1’). 
1 This paper may be regarded as a natural extension of [12]. 
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The game is assumed to be Markovian in the following sense: 
Prob[s(t + 1) 1 s(t), u(t), e)(t), past and future controls and 
states-of-the-game] = Prob[s(t + 1) 1 s(t), u(t), v(t)]. (2) 
A sufficiency condition for the validity of this assumption that t(O), e(l),... be 
statistically independent. A simple proof is given by Zadeh [l 11. 
The game terminates when either t = K or s(t) = s, , t = 1,2 ,..., K - 1. 
Some games do not have a “termination state” s, (or a set of such states); 
such games as these terminate only when t = K. For such games, suppress 
all reference to s, in the sequel. 
1.2. State Space and State 
Let S, indicate the n-dimensional unit simplex in the Euclidean space 
En+l; let So denote the (Y - I)-dimensional unit simplex in the space ET; 
and let Sy denote the (s - I)-dimensional unit simplex in the space Es, i.e., 
PO 10 O<Pi,<l 
i = 0, l,..., n 
SD2 pLJ i 
i Pi = 1 
, (3) 
p, 
0=0 
Ul 
j i) 
O<lJ,<l i = 1, 2,..., Y 
S,h ug 
ir i ui = 1 
, 
I O<Vi<l i = 1, 2,..., s 
(4) 
pi=1 
S, will be called the state space2 and a point p(t) E S, the state at stage t. 
State p(t) is admissible if p(t) E S, , i.e., if p(t) is a probability distribution 
over S. A point U(t) E Sr, will be called an admissible control vector for 
player P; a point V(t) E S, will be called an admissible control vector for 
player E. 
1.3. Conditional Probability Distribution Function 
As a result of the uncertainty f(t) the evolution of the state-of-the-game is 
nondeterministic, but yet, because of the Markovian assumption, com- 
pletely characterized by the conditional probability distribution function 
* This is not to imply that S, is a space in the mathematical sense of word, for it is 
not. 
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Prob[s(t + 1) / s(t), u(t), w(t)] and the probability distribution P(t) over S, 
t = 0, 1, 2 ,..., K - 1. Define 
Mil(~r, q , t) & Prob[s(t + 1) = s, ) s(t) = si , u(t) = uk, e)(t) = VJ (5) 
where i, j = 0, I,..., n; k = 1, 2 ,..., r; 1 = 1, 2 ,..., s. M(u, , o1 , t) is the 
matrix with (i - j)th element Mi3(~k , z+ , t); it is assumed that at least one 
of the matrices M(u, , wt , t) has nonzero jth column, j = 0, l,..., 11, at each 
stage t. We adopt the convention that M, = 1 and MOi E 0 for all j, k, 1, t. 
1.4. Strategies and Policies 
A policy for either player must prescribe for that player a choice of control 
at each stage of the game. But the choice of control at stage t depends upon 
the state-of-the-game s(t) at stage t,3 which both players can measure exactly.* 
Then the choice of control is conditionedupon the state-of-the-game at stage t. 
Thus a strategy n for player P is a vector functions defined on S, and 
having values, for all P(t) E S, , t E [0, K - 11, 
W) = 4t, p(t)) E su (6) 
where U(t) is an r-vector whose ith component is vi(t) 2 Prob[u(t) = ui]. 
A strategy E for player E is a vector functions defined on S, and having values, 
for all p(t) E S, , t E [0, K - 11, 
w = 46 P(4) E S” (7) 
where V(t) is an s-vector whose ith component Vi(t) h Prob[w(t) = q]. 
Let u(‘ct) be an T x (n + 1) decision matrix whose (i - j)th element is 
Uif(t) = Prob[u(t) = ui 1 s(t) = s,] 
i = 1, 2,..., I 
j = 0, l,..., 12 (8) 
and let v(t) be an s x (n + 1) decision matrix whose (i - j)th element is 
V,,(t) = Prob[w(t) = wi I s(t) = sj] 
i = 1, 2,..., s 
j = 0, 1 ,..., n, (9) 
where t E [0, K - I]. Denote the columns a(ct) by d”)(t), 01 = 0, l,..., n; 
denote the columns of v(t) by w@)(t), /3 = 0, l,..., it, i.e., 
u’“‘(t) = (~YJwfa(i) = (?J, (Y,p =O,l,..., n. (10) 
s Equivalently, decisions made at stage t depend upon all past decisions of both 
players and upon the initial state-of-the-game, since it is these that determine the 
state-of-the-game at stage t. 
’ Games with noisy measurements will be treated in a later section. 
6 The components of IT[C] are mi i = 1, 2 ,..., I [Q , i = 1, 2 ,..., s]. 
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Then t&)(t) E SU and r@(t) E Sy . Denote the rows of u(7(t) by u&t), 
K = 1, 2,..., Y; denote the rows of r(‘<t) by w&t), 1 = 1, 2 ,..., s, i.e., 
q,,(t) P (Uk&“., ~k?l(W k = 1, 2,..., I (11) 
qz)(t) 4 (~zo(t)Y*, ~znP>Y 1 = 1, 2 ,..., s. (12) 
Thus the “zeroth” columns of a(<t) and of ir(t) are identically zero. It follows 
that 
u(t) = 44 p(t)) = W)PW (13) 
Jqt) = 46 p(t)) = w> PO). (14) 
The decision sequence u(<t), o((t + I),..., U(K - l), will constitute the policy 
7~ of player P, while the decision sequence v(<t), v((t + l),..., p(K - I), will 
constitute the policy < of player E, t E [0, /z - 11. These decision sequences 
are precomputable in a mm-max sense (see Section 2.2). 
1.5. State Transition Equation 
The state transition equations, written in terms of the conditional proba- 
bility distribution function, the decision matrices, and the probability 
distribution over S, are 
p3(t + 1) = i i f: ~&k , 02 , t) Uki@) T/I,*(OPi(t) (15) 
i-o k-1 Z=l 
or, in vector-matrix notation 
p(t + 1) = i f: M=( #k 3 OZ 3 %&kdth w(Z,(th P@)>* (16) 
k==l Z=1 
The notation (a, b), where a and b are (A + I)-vectors, denotes the vector 
whose ith component is ai& , i.e., 
aObo 
(a, b) & i 
( 1 
. 
4, 
1.6. Expected Payoff 
The players strive to minimax the payoff functional 
K-l 
J = J=W,WX + C wtW + l), s(t), 44, WN (17) 
t-o 
where EXP denotes expectation, w&(K)) is the cost (to P) of termination, 
and w,(s(t + I), s(t), u(t), w(t)) is the cost of transfer from s(t) at stage t to 
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s(t + 1) at stage t + 1 using controls u(t) and o(t) at stage t. Usually this 
can be expressed in terms of p(t), u(ict), v(;i(t), and M(u, , or , t) as follows. 
Let C&h ,VZ , t) be the cost of transfer from s(t) = si to s(t + 1) = si , 
using controls uk and w, at stage t, and let 0~~ be the penalty for terminating in 
state-of-the-game s(K) = si . Then the expected cost of transfer from stage t 
to stage t + 1 is 
where d(u, , zll , t) is the vector whose ith component is 
Then the expected payoff at stage t, using policies 7j, c, is 
We take COi(uk , uz, t) = 0 for all j, R, 1, t. 
1 .I. Pure and Mixed Strategies 
The choice of strategies 7r and c may be regarded as the selection, at each 
stage, of 2n vectors-namely, u(&)(t), 01 = 1, 2,..., n, by player P, and 
z@)(t), /3 = 1, 2 )..., n, by player E, satisfying respectively, the constraints 
z+)(t) E S, and v@)(t) E Sy . The vectors u@(t) and d@(t) will be called 
decision vectors. The decision vector @J(t) will be called a “pure” decision 
vector if z@)(t) is a unit vecto#; otherwise it will be called a “mixed” decision 
vector. Similarly for v@)(t). The decision matrix a(i<t) will be called a pure 
decision matrix if the decision vectors t&)(t), a = 1, 2,..., n, are pure decision 
vectors; otherwise it will be called a mixed decision matrix. Similarly for r(<t). 
The policy % will be called a pure policy if every o(t), t E [0, K - 11, is a 
pure decision matrix; otherwise it will be called a mixed policy. Similarly 
for <. 
6 For the purpose of the definition a unit vector is considered to be a vector, all of 
whose components are zero save one, which is 1. 
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2. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS 
2.1. Optimality 
Policy 75.*, E* is optimal if 
l(p(t), K; ii*, q d /(p(t), K; +*, c*> d J(p(t), K; 5, C*), 
i.e., 
J*(P(o) A .J(p(t), K; f *, 2) = Inp l-n: ](p(t); K, 7j, E) (20) 
J*@(t)) is the expected value (i.e., the optimal expected payoff) of the game 
at state p(t) at stage t. 
The double inequality and Eq. (20) are intended to imply, using Eq. (22) 
below, 
i.e., 
AP(O p(t) d w p(t) d w PM 
A/(t) < &(t) < &E(t) vj 
AP(t) [F(t)] is th e vector of expected costs at stage t corresponding to policy 
75*, qi;, E*]. 
2.2. Optimal Expected Payoff Vector 
Let h(t) be the (rz + 1)-vector whose ith component, hi(t), is the expected 
value of the game from state-of-the-game s(t) = si at stage t, i.e., 
t, uki(t> vZXt) + J*(P(t + I)) (21) 
which is a statement of Bellman’s principle of optimality [17]. Then by 
definition of expectation 
.I*( P(t)) = W) PM (22) 
and hence 
J*W) = n&n 2;~ i i’ W, , vz 3 t)<+dt), vcz,W, P(t)> 
k=lZ=l 
+ J*(P@ + 1))1. 
The latter equation can be rewritten, using Eq. (22), as 
0 = nj” 2;~ i i d=k, , vz , t)(<w(t), v(z)(t)>, P(t)> 
k=lZ=l 
(23) 
+qt + 1)p(t + 1) -WP@$ (24) 
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Using Eq. (16), this becomes 
+ i i [M(u,, VI, t)h(t + l)]*((uc~:,(t), ou,(t)i,p(t)? -hr(t)p(t) j, (25) 
k=lI=l 
I.e., 
where 
%z&) g [44x, 01 , t) + W% , vz , t) qt + l)l* , 
from which it follows, provided p,(t) > 0, that 
(27) 
(28) 
In terms of the matrix &j(t) defined as 
this last equation becomes 
x,(t) = In:” ln~{[u”‘(t)]’ l+‘(t) a’“‘(t)} 
= [,w*(t)]T &r(t) 7,!(z)*(t) i=O,l n. ,*-*, (30) 
Equations (27) and (30) give the following recursive relationship for the 
optimal expected payoff vector h(t): 
A(t) = i i <4% I v2 , t) + W% , uz , t) 4t + 11, Mm1 4dW 
k=l 2-1 
t = 0, l,..., K - 1 (31) 
with boundary condition 
h(K) = a (32) 
obtained from Eqs. (19) and (22) when t = K. 
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2.3. Necessary and Su$cient Conditions 
Equation (30) is a necessary condition for optimality of the pair m*, E*. 
Since Uz > 0 and I’$ 3 0 Vk, I, i, it follows that Eq. (30) will be satisfied 
if, for each z = 0, I,..., n, 
and 
k = 1, Z..., r (33) 
1 = 1, 2,..., s (34) 
The decision vectors u(i)*(t) and w(i)(t) will in general be mixed. Solutions in 
mixed decision vectors will generally exist for each s(t) = si , i = 1, 2,..., n, 
when the sets U and V are finite and K < 0~). 
If at state-of-the-game s(t) = s, there exist solutions in pure decision 
vectors, then it follows that there exist integers ki , 1 < ki < Y, and Z* ,
1 < li < s, such that 
(35) 
i.e., the integers ki and Zi are saddlepoint integers of the matrix aft)(t). 
Conversely, if the matrix a(i)(t) possesses a saddlepoint, then there exist 
solutions in pure decision vectors at state-of-the-game s(t) = s, . The proof 
of this statement is the usual ([ 161 or [18]) giving 
hi(t) = mjn mgx a&t) = akll,,(t), (37) 
from which Eqs. (35) and (36) follow immediately. 
The state transition equation, Eq. (16), can be written as 
PQ 4 1) = w P(t), (38) 
where 
W) A i f: MT@, , 02 2 t) P(r)(t) w(t) 
P=l kl 
k = 1, 2 ,..., Y, 
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Thus 
where 
f-l 
P(t) = n p(4P(t')v 0 < t’ < t < AT, 
r=t, 
(39) 
t-1 
TrJ P(T) g P(t - 1) P(t - 2) ..* P(t’ + 1) P(t’). 
When the play is optimal, all terms in the above equations (except 
Mr(u, , w1 , t) and p(t)) will be superscripted with a *. 
Note that the optimal decision matrices a*(t) and v*(t) are independent 
of p(t) for all t. 
2.4. Noisy Measurements 
The theory and results of the previous sections assume that both players 
can perfectly measure the state-of-the-game at each stage t. Consider again 
the problem stated in Section 1 .l except now both players make noisy 
measurements of the state-of-the-game. Player P makes measurements 
YPW = gPW TPW) WJ) 
and player E makes measurements 
r”(t) = mth VW (41) 
where gp and gE are known deterministic functions, y’(t) and p(t) assume 
values in the finite set Y & {yr ,..., y,}, and VP(t) and f(t) are random 
variables with known statistics and whose sample values range over finite sets 
defined in a manner analogous to the set S in Section 1.1. Given the mea- 
surements yP(t) and y”(t), the quantities 
PdrPW> Li ProWyW I s(t) = 4 
Pi) 4 ProbbEP) Is(t) = sil 
i = 0, l,..., n (42) 
are known; let p(yP(t)) and p(yE(t)) d eno e, t respectively, the (n + I)-vector 
whose ith component is pi(yP(t)) an w d h ose ith component is pz(yE(t)). 
Each player now seIects his optimal decision vectors at stage t conditioned 
upon current and all available previous measurements of the states-of-the- 
game.’ 
’ Equivalently, the current decision is conditioned on the current measurement 
and all previous decisions. See footnote 3. 
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Player P strives to minimize 
[ 
K-l 
J' = ED eofW7> + ; wtts(t + 11, s(t), u(t), W) I yp(~) , (43) 
7 1 
whereas player E strives to maximize 
[ 
K-l 
J” = ED MAW) + tz W&O + 1>,4t), 4% N> I FEb) 1 , (44 
where 
m> A 14K9, YP(l),..., YW, 
FEW ii {YE(o), YE(l),..., YEW>. 
These can usually be written as 
(45) 
K-l t s 
J” = c++(K, 7) + 1 1 c d=(%c, ‘%, t)<<&(t), W(t, +,I% T)> (46) 
t=+ k=l 1=1 
and the dynamics, insofar as player P is concerned, are given by 
p’(t + 1, T) = f: i M=( uk > OZ 9 t)(<U(k)(t, ‘% v;,(tb,$P(2, 7’)) t 27 (47) 
k=lZ=l 
and insofar as player E is concerned by 
In these equations pP(t, T) is an (n + 1)-vector whose ith component is 
pzP(t, T) = Prob[s(t) = si 1 Fp(~)] (49) 
and similarly, pE(t, T) is an (n + I)-vector with ith component 
p,yt, T) = Prob[s(t) = si 1 FE(~)] (50) 
Also 
W&T> = (;z 1;)~ W@,T) = (;z 1;)~ (51) 
where 
&&(t, T) 4 Prob[u(t) = Uk 1 s(t) = si , t g3 7-j k = 1, 2,..., r, 
Vri(t, 7) & Prob[w(t) = zll 1 s(t) = si , t > 71 1 = 1, 2 )..., s. 
(52) 
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We have 
0 = Uki(f, T), Vti(f, T) f 1 VK, I, i, t, 7, 
k$ Uk,(f, T) = 1, i VJf, 7) = 1 Vi, f, T. 
kl 
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(53) 
In Eqs. (46)-(48) cognizance is taken of the fact that each player strives to 
optimize against his opponent’s optimal pIay as determined by his available 
measurement and decision histories. Define 
U,(t, T) & Prob[u(t) = ui j yp(7)] 
vi(t, T) & Prob[v(t) = wi 1 F(T)] 
i = 1,2,..., r 
i = 1, 2 ,..., s. 
(54) 
From Eqs. (49) (52), and (54), 
u(f, T) = o(f, T)p’(f, T) 
v(f, T) = v(f, T)p”(f, T) 
(55) 
where cr(‘(t, T) is an r-vector whose ith component is ri,(f, T) and v(‘(t, T) is an 
s-vector whose ith component is vi(i(t, T). o(f, T) is an T X (n + 1) matrix 
with (i -j)th element u,,(f, T) and r(i(t, T) is an s X (n + 1) matrix with 
(i - j)th element vZj(t, T). 
The problem reduces to the solution of two separate one-side game 
problems: one, the minimization of Jr subject to Eqs. (47) and (53); the 
other, the maximization of Jr subject to Eqs. (48) and (53). The methods of 
the earlier sections of this paper or of [12] apply. In particular, if these pro- 
blems are solved for two different values of T, say T1 , ~a, then 
o*(f, 71) = o*(f, 72) 
Y*(f, Tl) = r*(f, T2) 
vi > 71 I 72 
so that 
a*(f) -= a*(f, T) 
r*(f) = Vi*(f, 7) 
VT, f > 7. 
Thus 
rr*(f, T) = D*(f) $“(f, T) 
v*(f, T) = F*(f) p’(f, T) 
f, 7 = 0, I,..., K - 1, 
Only the vectors u*(~, T) and F*(T, r), T = 0, l,..., K 
to execute the gaming sequence. Thus 
u*(T, T) = u*(T) p’(T, T) 
1.‘*(T, T) = P*(T) p”(T, 7). 
- 1, are required 
(56) 
(57) 
f 2 7. (58) 
(5% 
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The vectors p”(r, T) and ~“(7, T) are given by 
Let us compare this theory with that developed some twenty-five years 
ago by Von Neumann and Morgenstem [16]. In making this comparison, it is 
assumed that the reader is familiar with that classic work. It should first be 
noted that Eqs. (30)-(32), useful in determining the optimal decision vectors 
and the expected optimal payoff vector at each stage t, are equivalent, if not 
identical, to the conditions developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern to 
obtain the optimal mixed strategies and values of their matrix games. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern discuss games in both extended and 
normalized form; with complete rigor they demonstrate the equivalence of 
both descriptions of a game. They then proceed to obtain necessary con- 
ditions for games in normalized form. In practice their theory-being a static 
one-requires, prior to the application of the necessary conditions, that a 
finite multistage game be reduced, through the process of normalization, to a 
single stage game. Thus their necessary conditions are applicable to a one 
stage game with specified initial state, whereas the necessary conditions 
obtained in this paper are applicable, stage by stage, to a finite multistage 
game, for each state-of-the-game s(t) = si for which p,(t) # 0.a In any case, 
known aIgorithms can be used to determine the quantities G*(t), Rio)* 
and h,(t), i = 1, 2 ,..., n. Particularly effective among these are the pivot 
method of linear programming l-18, 19, 201 and an algorithm developed by 
Brown [21] and J. Robinson [22]. 
s We quote from [16, Sect. 4.8.31. “A dynamic theory - when one is found - 
will probably describe the changes (presumably, in the states-of-the-game) in terms 
of a single imputation - valid at the moment under consideration - or something 
similar.” This imputation is, of course, J*&(t)), t E [0, K - 11. 
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Although much descriptive simplicity is achieved by the reduction of a 
game to its normalized form, the computations necessary to effect a solution 
are generally increased thereby. For consider a game in which U contains Y 
elements; I’, s elements; S, n elements; and there are K stages. Then in 
normalized form there are yK possible strategies available to player P and sK 
possible strategies available to player E. The Von Neumann and Morgenstem 
theory requires the solution of an yK x sK payoff matrix for a given initial 
state-of-the-game, whereas the present theory requires the solution of at 
most n(K - 1) + 1 Y x s matrices for a given initial state-of-the-game. If, 
for example, Y = s = 2 and K = 3, one would have to work with a single 
8 x 8 payoff matrix as opposed to 2n + 1 2 x 2 matrices; even if n is large, 
the latter approach will usually require less computation time and cost. 
Considering all rz possible initial states-of-the-game (the Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern theory would treat this as n distinct games), the former theory 
would have to deal computationally with II Y K x SK payoff matrices as opposed 
to at most nK r X s matrices. 
Finally, by decomposing the game with noisy measurements into two one- 
sided game problems (Section 2.4), it becomes no longer clear that the double 
inequality, Eq. (20), is satisfied. The behavioral strategies obtained must 
then be regarded as “sub-optimal,” i.e., the best that can be achieved under 
the circumstances of imperfect information but using all available measure- 
ment and decision data to determine the probable past play of the opponent. 
This objection is not considered serious in light of the remarks of the last 
paragraph; however, because of this point, the theory must be regarded as 
incomplete. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
A theory of discrete K-stage n-state stochastic game problems has been 
presented. Equations enablingthe determination of optimal decision sequences 
have been obtained for the cases of perfect measurement and noisy measure- 
ment of the states-of-the-game. These precomputed matrix sequences con- 
stitute optimal feedback strategies for the game. 
This theory, a dynamic one, requires less computation than is required by 
the static theory of Von Neumann and Morgenstern for solving matrix games 
in normalized form. 
Much additional work remains to be done in discrete dynamic gaming. 
Extensions of the present work may include the study of continuous games 
and games for which the state and/or the control sets have an infinity of 
elements. Also of interest are infinite stage games. Improving computation 
schemes for determining optimal strategies [ 11, 231 is not yet a closed field of 
investigation. 
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Stochastic differential games have received some attention recently [ 13-151, 
but investigations in this area have been confined for the most part to games 
with linear dynamics and quadratic payoff. 
4. A TWO-STAGE PURSUIT GAME 
The game is played in a dark four-walled enclosure. Players P and E 
initially occupy different corners of the room; at each stage both players must 
move to an adjacent corner. Capture occurs when the players either pass each 
other in transit or occupy the same corner at the same time. Player P wishes 
to minimize the cost of capture, whereas player E desires the opposite. The 
game terminates after two moves. 
Let the states-of-the-game be the “distance, ” measured counterclockwise 
from E, of P from E; see Fig. 1. 
P. *P 
s(t) = ss 
T/, 
s(t) = sg 
E- *P 
s(t) = s1 
FIG. 1. Two-stage pursuit game 
Case (1): Perfect Information 
In this case both players peek before making decisions. The control sets 
are U = {z+ , uz} and P = (~1~ , ZJ~}, where the indices “I” and “2” denote 
the decisions to “move clockwise” and “move counterclockwise,” respectively. 
The transition matrices are easily determined 
1 0 0 0 
M(u. 0. t\ = M(u, ) ‘02 )t) = 0100 i 1 o o I o 0001 
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where t = 0, 1. The cost of making transitions is given by the following cost 
matrices: 
Also, player P suffers a penalty should s(2) = s,: ~7 = (1 0 0 0). Following 
the procedures of the text, 
a(O)(l) = (“, “,), a(l)(l) = (; A), 
a(2)(1) = (; ;,, u(3)(1) = (; ;j, 
a*(l) = i”, ; : :, 1 = v*(l), 
0 0 !f 0 
P(1) = i 0100 ! 
0 0 4 0’ 
0 0 0 1 
Working back to stage t = 0, the computations yield 
P(0) = P(1). 
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The results are in accord with intuition. In particular, note that the proba- 
bility of capture on the first move, given s(O) = sa is 4: 
0 * 
p(l) = P(0) ; = y 
ij ii 0 0" 
and the probability of capture in two moves is Aa(O) = 2. 
Note also that whenever s(t) = sa , we have a situation called “perpetuated 
dilemma” by Isaacs [l] requiring mixed decision vectors even though the 
game is one of perfect information. 
Case (2): Imperfect Information 
In this case the players are not allowed to peek. The (measured) initial state is 
Then 
u*(o, 0) =D*(o) pqo, 0) = (0" v: Jii) = Q 
and similarly 
v*(o, 0) = : . 0 
Then 
The probability of capture on the first move is p,( 1,O) = 4. 
Suppose now that player E has played w(O) = va and capture did not occur. 
Then on the basis of these measurements and the known optimal control 
vector 
u*(o, 0) = : 0 
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of player P, he estimates that P’s decision matrix was9 
Then player E’s new estimate of the state is 
If player E had played o(O) = zlr and capture did not occur, then by similar 
reasoning, his new estimate of the state would be 
Similarly, if player P had moved clockwise (u(0) = ur) and capture did not 
occur, he would estimate the state to be 
0 
pP(1, 1) = i 
ii 
3 
Q 
and if he had moved counterclockwise (u(0) = ur) and capture did not occur, 
his new estimate would be 
In any event, the new control vectors will be 
u*(l, 1) = sr*(l)p’(l, 1) = C) or (i), 
v*(i, I) = V*(*)pE(l, 1) = (3 or (3, 
D The notation o(O, 1) is meant o imply the decision matrix at stage 0 given the 
measurements at stage 1. 
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where each player plays the former vector if he moved clockwise on the 
first move and the latter vector if he moved counterclockwise on the first 
move. In other words, player E favors his initial direction whereas player P 
does not. 
We compute p(2,O) to be 
The probability of capture in two moves is Q + & = 8;. 
The possible decision sequences and the optimal mixings are provided 
below: 
Ul% - Q 
P: E: 
VP3 - 6 
U2Ul - Q 1 fwl - 6 
tql2 - Q 1 %V2 - 3’ 
This game is a very special case of Isaac’s Princess and Monster [l]. This 
section and the methods of this paper may provide useful insights toward a 
general solution of that problem. 
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